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NOTES
TIBBS V. FLORIDA: A DUBIOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN
WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE IN THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CONTEXT
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o
person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb. . . ."I The amount of protection this clause provided to
a defendant whose conviction had been reversed remained unclear2 until 1978,
when the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause
barred retrial after a conviction was reversed due to insufficient evidence.'
A reversal for insufficient evidence occurs when a court, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, determines that no rational
trier of fact could find that the elements of the charged offense were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt." In other words, when there are questions regard-
ing the sufficiency of evidence, a court's review is limited to the narrow
consideration of whether every element of the crime charged has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt; such a review does not concern the credibility
of the evidence.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
3. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
4. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). Jackson established the standard
that a conviction must be based upon sufficient evidence, which the Court defined as the evidence
required to persuade the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the essen-
tial elements of the crime. Id. at 316. The Jackson Court stated that if the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard was not met, the conviction could not be upheld. Id. at 317-18. The Jackson
test of the sufficiency of evidence has been employed in many subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Henderson, 680 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1982) (the sufficiency test involves
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution); Stacy v. Love, 679 F.2d
1209, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1982) (in responding to a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
to determine if a rational fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); United States
v. McQueeney, 674 F.2d 109, 111 (1st Cir. 1982) (in evaluating a contention that the evidence
was insufficient to convict, an appellate court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government to decide whether the trier of fact could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt). See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 467 (1982)
(explaining the test of sufficiency of evidence within the context of a motion for judgment
of acquittal under FED. R. CRus. P. 29).
5. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979) (a review of the sufficiency of
evidence does not concern the credibility of the evidence); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d
616, 648 (5th Cir. 1982) (an appellate court's role in considering the sufficiency of evidence
is "strictly limited"), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 3489 (1982); United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d
441, 448 (7th Cir. 1980) (it is not the function of a court in determining the sufficiency of
evidence to balance inconsistent testimony, consider credibility, or draw inferences); see also
2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 467, at 663-65 (discussing the limited role of a court when
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Recently, in Tibbs v. Florida,6 the Supreme Court considered whether the
double jeopardy clause barred retrial of a criminal defendant after a state
appellate court reversed a conviction on the grounds that the trial court's
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. A reversal based on the weight
of the evidence occurs when a court, in effect acting as a thirteenth juror,
weighs all the evidence, assesses its credibility, and determines that it does
not support the verdict. 7 Therefore, when there are questions concerning the
weight of evidence, a court's review involves the broad consideration of
whether the evidence, viewed in its entirety, is credible.' When engaging in
this type of review, a court does not consider whether the evidence presented,
if believed, was sufficient to prove the essential elements of the crime.9
Rather, the question of evidentiary weight concerns the credibility or
believability of the evidence presented. In contrast, the question of suffi-
ciency of evidence revolves around whether the prosecution presented enough
evidence to prove the elements of the charged offense. The Tibbs Court
distinguished a reversal based on the broad ground that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence, from a reversal based on the narrow
ground that the evidence was insufficient."0 While the Tibbs Court
it considers the sufficiency of evidence). But see Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 (6th
Cir. 1979) (in cases questioning the sufficiency of evidence, a reviewing court gives considera-
tion to the relative weight of evidence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
6. 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982).
7. The notion that a court acts as a thirteenth juror, because it must weigh the evidence
and consider its credibility when it reverses a conviction for being against the weight of the
evidence, has been expressed in many cases. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 576 F.2d 840,
845 n.1 (10th Cir. 1978); Brodie v. United States, 295 F.2d 157, 159-60 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Ap-
plebaum v. United States, 274 F.2d 43, 46 (7th Cir. 1921); United States v. Turner, 490 F.
Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (trial courts apply the same test in evaluating sufficiency
and weight of evidence), aff'd, 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981);
see also 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 553, at 245-48 (explaining the function and role of
a court ruling on a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 33).
8. See United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980) (in deciding whether
a verdict is against the weight of the evidence on a motion for a new trial, a court may weigh
all the evidence and consider its credibility, rather than view only the evidence which is most
favorable to the prosecution); United States v. Simms, 508 F. Supp. 1188, 1202 (W.D. La.
1980) (when a court determines whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, its
power to weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of witnesses is considerably broader
than when it determines whether the evidence was merely sufficient); United States v. Turner,
490 F. Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (there is a "much broader standard of review" on
a motion alleging that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence than there is on a motion
contending that the evidence is insufficient); see also 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 553, at
245 (declaring that a court has broader power when it considers evidentiary weight than it
does when it considers the sufficiency).
9. See United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980) (regardless of whether
there is an "abstract sufficiency" of evidence, a court may still find a verdict to be against
the weight of the evidence); United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(a court can determine the question of evidentiary credibility despite the fact that the evidence
is sufficient to prove the essential elements of the crime).
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2217-21.
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acknowledged that a finding of insufficient evidence raised a double jeopardy
bar against retrial," it held that no such bar arises upon a finding that a
conviction is merely against the weight of the evidence.' 2
While a distinction may be drawn between reversals based on the weight
of evidence and those based on the sufficiency of evidence, this Note will
illustrate that it is not a proper distinction to be made in the double jeopardy
context. Just as the double jeopardy clause bars retrial after a reversal of
a conviction based on insufficient evidence, the protection afforded by that
clause also should be extended to bar retrial after a reversal of a conviction
based on the weight of the evidence.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A BAR TO RETRIAL
The seminal case concerning the retrial of an accused who successfully
appealed a conviction is United States v. Ball. 3 In that case, the United
States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar retry-
ing defendants who had successfully obtained reversals of their convictions
on the grounds that their indictments were defective." Implicit in the Court's
holding was the notion that a defendant, by appealing his conviction, waives
the right to be free from double jeopardy.' 5 While Ball involved retrial after
a reversal on procedural grounds,' 6 it nevertheless has been perceived as the
starting point for analyzing a series of double jeopardy cases which deal
with reversals of convictions on evidentiary grounds as well.' 7
Supreme Court decisions following Ball initially indicated acceptance of
the concept, implicit in Ball, that a defendant waives the right to be free
from double jeopardy by appealing his conviction. These cases, generally
referred to as the Bryan-Forman line of decisions, established the rule that
a defendant who seeks a new trial on appeal waives the right to be free
11. Id. at 2217.
12. Id. at 2213.
13. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). Ball concerned a trial of three men indicted for murder. Two
of the defendants were convicted, while the third was acquitted. Id. at 66-4. The two convicted
men successfully appealed their convictions on the grounds that the indictment was defective
because it failed to state the time and place of the victim's death. Id. A new indictment charg-
ing the three men was filed and they were retried despite their double jeopardy objections.
Id. at 665. All three defendants were convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 666. The Supreme
Court reviewed the convictions and held that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial of the
defendant who had been acquitted on the faulty indictment. Id. at 667-70. The Court did not
find a double jeopardy bar to retrial of the two defendants who successfully had their initial
convictions set aside on procedural grounds. Id. at 672.
14. Id. at 672.
15. See Thompson, Reversals for Insufficient Evidence: The Emerging Doctrine of Appellate
Acquittal, 8 IND. L. REv. 497, 504 n.20 (1975) (Ball established that when a defendant takes
affirmative action to set aside a conviction, any double jeopardy defense at retrial is waived).
16. Id. at 505 (a defective indictment is a "procedural defect").
17. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) ("Ball appears to represent the first
instance in which this Court considered in any detail the double jeopardy implications of an
appellate reversal.").
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from double jeopardy.'" This rule was developed in situations involving both
convictions reversed on procedural grounds,' 9 and convictions reversed for
insufficiency of evidence.20
A later group of decisions dealing with the waiver concept suggested by
Ball involved only convictions reversed for insufficiency of evidence. These
decisions rejected the concept that a defendant can waive his double jeopardy
defense simply by pursuing such a reversal. The major case, Burks v. United
States,2' examined the Bryan-Forman line of decisions22 and declared that
18. The Bryan-Forman line of decisions consists of four cases. The first case, Bryan v.
United States, 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950), held that a defendant, who on appeal sought either
acquittal or a new trial, was not placed in double jeopardy when his conviction was reversed
and the case was remanded on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to convict him.
The next case in this line of decisions was Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (per
curiam). In his concurrence in Sapir, Justice Douglas maintained that after a reversal due to
insufficiency of evidence, dismissal of the indictment was required if the defendant had not
requested a new trial in the alternative; therefore, he implied that Bryan was limited. Id. at
373-74 (Douglas, J., concurring). Two years later, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298
(1957), the Court again dealt with the double jeopardy implications of retrial after appellate
reversal. While the Yates Court did not allow retrial when there was "palpably insufficient"
evidence, it stated that it was within its power to order a new trial in such a case, especially
if a new trial as well as an acquittal had been requested. Id. at 327-28. The final case in the
Bryan-Forman line of decisions was Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960). In Forman,
the Court held that when a person successfully appealed a conviction and requested a new
trial, double jeopardy was not a bar to retrial even though the request for a new trial did
not pertain to the grounds for reversal. Id. at 425. Together, the four Bryan-Forman decisions
stand for the proposition that once a defendant moves for a new trial on any ground as one
form of relief, he has waived a double jeopardy defense at a subsequent trial. See generally
Note, Double Jeopardy. The Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 549,
560-63 (1977) (discussion of the waiver theory as employed in the Bryan-Forman line of deci-
sions) [hereinafter cited as Note, Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions].
19. See Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 418-19 (1960) (reversal of conviction because
charge was improperly submitted to jury).
20. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 328 (1957); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S.
373, 373-74 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552, 553 (1950).
21. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). Burks involved a petitioner who had been convicted in district court
of robbing a bank with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 2. The petitioner moved for a new trial
on the grounds that the evidence purporting to implicate him in the crime was insufficient.
Id. at 3. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the government had not rebut-
ted effectively the petitioner's proof of insanity, which was essentially a finding of insufficient
evidence. United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968, 970 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit relied
on 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976) (appellate court may remand or require additional proceedings
"as may be just under the circumstances"), and Bryan as its authority for remanding the case
for a determination of whether an acquittal should be entered or a new trial ordered. 547
F.2d at 970. Subsequently, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the double jeopardy
clause was a bar to a second trial when there had been an appellate reversal of a conviction
on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient. Burks, 437 U.S. at 1.
22. The Burks Court found that Bryan allowed retrial regardless of the ground for ap-
pellate reversal. 437 U.S. at 6. Additionally, the Burks Court perceived Sapir as precluding
retrial after a reversal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient, unless a new trial
had been requested. Id. at 7. Further, the Burks majority viewed Yates as acknowledging ap-
pellate court authority to remand for retrial after a reversal for insufficient evidence. Id. at
8. According to the Burks Court, Forman was ambiguous because it allowed appellate courts
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those decisions "can hardly be characterized as models of consistency and
clarity." 2 Burks overruled these decisions to the extent that they allowed
retrial after a conviction was reversed for insufficiency of evidence.2" The
Burks Court held that the double jeopardy clause barred retrial of a defen-
dant whose conviction was reversed "due to failure of proof at trial," '
regardless of whether the defendant had requested a new trial." The pur-
pose of the double jeopardy clause, according to Burks, was to prevent multi-
ple prosecutions for the same offense.27 Central to this purpose was denial
to the prosecution of "another opportunity to supply evidence which it fail-
ed to muster in the first proceeding." 2 Nevertheless, distinguishing rever-
sals based on insufficiency of evidence from those based on procedural er-
ror, the Burks Court concluded that in the latter situation the double jeopardy
clause did not bar retrial.29 The Court justified this distinction by noting
that a reversal for procedural error "implies nothing with respect to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant [while] . . . [t]he same cannot be said when
a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at
trial. .... ,30 This distinction reflects the Burks Court's concern over whether
a particular reversal reflected the defendant's guilt or innocence.'
In Greene v. Massey,32 decided the same day as Burks, the Court extended
the Burks holding to encompass state proceedings." Thus, the double
to go beyond the defendant's request for relief by ordering a retrial, while it also suggested
that retrial would be precluded when a defendant did not request a new trial and his conviction
was reversed for insufficient evidence. Id. at 8-9. The Burks majority noted that the Forman
holding did not clearly distinguish between reversals based on trial error and reversals based
on insufficiency of evidence. Id.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 17.
27. Id. at l1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14-16.
30. Id. at 15-16.
31. Similar notions were expressed by the Court in another case decided on the same day
as Burks. In United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), a dismissal was granted before a
verdict was returned due to prejudice caused by preindictment delay. The Court held that there
was no double jeopardy bar to a government appeal of a dismissal in such circumstances.
Id. at 98-99. The basis of the decision in Scott was that the defendant opted to terminate
the proceeding on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. Id. at 99. The Scott Court implied
that there would be different double jeopardy implications if the dismissal were based on ques-
tions of guilt or innocence. Id. at 96.
32. 437 U.S. 19 (1978). Greene involved a petitioner who had been sentenced to death in
a Florida trial court. Id. at 20. In Sosa v. State, 215 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1968) (per curiam),
the Florida Supreme Court reversed Greene's conviction and remanded his case for a new trial.
The state supreme court held that evidence was lacking in establishing the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the interests of justice required a new trial. Id. at 737.
A special concurrence seemed to rest the reversal on procedural errors. Id. at 737-46 (Ervin,
J., concurring). Because of this ambiguity, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a deter-
mination of the ground for reversal. 437 U.S. at 26-27.
33. 437 U.S. at 24.
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jeopardy clause was held to bar retrial when a state appellate court reversed
a defendant's conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence.34
To summarize, the pre-Burks cases allowed a defendant to be retried after
a reversal of his conviction on the theory that by seeking appeal, the defen-
dant had waived the right not to be placed in double jeopardy. In overrul-
ing these decisions, to the extent that they assumed such waiver, the Burks
Court focused on both the purposes underlying the double jeopardy clause
and the basis for the particular reversal. Consequently, in Burks, the Supreme
Court announced that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial of a defen-
dant whose conviction is reversed on the basis of insufficient evidence. Fur-
thermore, this bar was held to be applicable in both state and federal
proceedings.
REVERSALS BASED ON WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE AS A BAR TO RETRIAL
The Facts and Procedural History of Tibbs v. Florida
In 1974, Delbert Tibbs was convicted of rape and first degree murder by
a jury in a Florida trial court. 5 Pursuant to the jury's recommendation,
Tibbs was sentenced to death. 6 In Tibbs v. State37 (Tibbs 1), Tibbs appealed
his conviction directly to the Florida Supreme Court.3" Florida law provided
that in a prosecution for rape, no corroborating evidence was necessary to
support the victim's testimony and eyewitness identification.39 Nonetheless,
Florida courts were required to scrutinize closely such testimony and
identification °. 4  The Florida Supreme Court enumerated six weaknesses in
the state's evidence that created serious doubt concerning Tibbs's guilt.4 1
34. Id.
35. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2215 (1982).
36. Id.
37. 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976).
38. Id. at 790. The Florida Supreme Court has a statutory duty to review convictions in
which the death sentence is imposed. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1975); FLA. APP. R. 6.16(b)
(1962) (recodified as FLA. App. R. 9.140(f) (1982)). Rule 9.140(f) provides, in part: "In capital
cases, the court shall review the evidence to determine if the interest of justice requires a new
trial, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an issue presented for review."
39. See Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1976) (citing Thomas v. State, 167 So.
2d 309 (Fla. 1964)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 790-91. The six weaknesses in the state's evidence were as follows: (1) other than
the victim's testimony, the state produced no evidence to place Tibbs in the area where the
crime was committed at the time it occurred; (2) while the victim gave a detailed description
of the vehicle driven by her assailant, no such vehicle was ever found; (3) the police found
neither a gun, nor car keys to the assailant's vehicle, in Tibbs's possession; (4) Tibbs was very
cooperative with the police when he was stopped and questioned by them, and when he was
arrested; (5) the state produced no evidence casting doubt on Tibbs's veracity; and (6) several
factors cast doubt on the victim's testimony, such as her use of marijuana throughout the
day of the crime, her assertion that the crime occurred in daylight while independent evidence
indicated that the crime occurred after nightfall, and the method employed in her photographic
identification of Tibbs. Id.
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Because of the doubt raised by these evidentiary weaknesses, the Florida
court reversed Tibbs's conviction and remanded his case for a new trial. 2
On remand, the trial court interpreted Tibbs I as being based on a find-
ing of insufficient evidence."3 Thus, relying on Burks, the trial court dis-
missed the indictment on the grounds that retrial would violate the double
jeopardy clause." On appeal, the state appellate court characterized the
Florida Supreme Court's reversal in Tibbs I as one based on evidentiary
weight." Interpreting Florida precedent as allowing retrial after a reversal
based on the weight of the evidence, 6 the appellate court held that Burks
and Greene were not controlling and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's
decision with orders for a new trial. 7
On review, in Tibbs v. State"8 (Tibbs I), the Florida Supreme Court
similarly held that Burks and Greene did not bar retrial. 9 Consistent with
Burks and Greene, the state supreme court concluded that a reversal due
to insufficiency of evidence barred retrial, while a reversal for procedural
error did not."0 Moreover, agreeing with the appellate court, the supreme
court stated that its reversal in Tibbs I had been based on the weight of
the evidence,5 or in other words, that "the evidence [was] technically suffi-
cient but its weight [was] so tenuous or insubstantial that a new trial [was]
ordered in the interests of justice." 2 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court
42. Id. at 791.
43. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2215 (1982).
44. Id.
45. State v. Tibbs, 370 So. 2d 386, 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
46. Id. at 387. The court cited the following cases: State v. Coles, 91 So. 2d 200 (Fla.
1956) (when there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, a new trial should not be
granted unless injustice would result); Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So. 2d 106 (1944) (when
the ends of justice will best be served by granting a new trial due to the inconclusiveness of
the testimony, it is the court's duty to remand for a new trial); Woodward v. State, 113 Fla.
301, 151 So. 509 (1933) (the ends of justice will be served by granting a new trial when the
evidence raises serious doubt as to the defendant's guilt); Skiff v. State, 107 Fla. 90, 144 So.
323 (1932) (per curiam) (the court should reverse a conviction and order a new trial when
the evidence is contradictory or insubstantial); Fuller v. State, 92 Fla. 873, 110 So. 528 (1926)
(per curiam) (a conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted when the evidence as
to the identity of the accused is not satisfactory); Nims v. State, 70 Fla. 530, 70 So. 565 (1915)
(a new trial should be awarded when the evidence bearing on the identity of the accused is
not satisfactory); Williams v. State, 58 Fla. 138, 50 So. 749 (1909) (after a jury convicted
three codefendants, but the evidence only supported a conviction of one of them, justice re-
quired a new trial for all three); Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So. 2d 690 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App.) (a
new trial may be granted when the weight of the evidence is of very questionable probative
value), cert. denied, 240 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 951 (1971)).
47. 370 So. 2d at 388.
48. 397 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 1127.
50. Id. at 1122. The court reasoned that a "reversal for insufficient evidence is essentially
an acquittal," while a reversal for procedural error "does not indicate that the government's
case failed .... " Id.
51. Id. at 1126.
52. Id. at 1122-23.
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declared that such reversals were of questionable validity and, although declin-
ing to recharacterize its prior holding,53 admitted the impropriety of
reweighing the evidence in Tibbs L 4 Finally, the Tibbs II court held that
reversals based on evidentiary weight were not to be employed by Florida
courts in the future."
The Holding and Rationale of Tibbs v. Florida
The Supreme Court granted certiorari16 to consider "whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars retrial after a state appellate court sets aside a convic-
tion on the ground that the verdict was against 'the weight of the
evidence.' "I' The Tibbs Court held that retrial is not barred in such
circumstances.5" In so holding, the Court emphasized the general rule that
the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant who
succeeds in obtaining a reversal of his conviction; the Court viewed Burks
as establishing only a "narrow exception" 59 to this rule. The Tibbs Court
also viewed Burks as resting on two policies. The first policy concerned the
special significance which must be accorded judgments of acquittal in light
of the double jeopardy implications of retrial. 6" The Court stated that a find-
ing of insufficient evidence should be given the same effect as an acquittal
"because it means that no rational factfinder could have voted to convict
the defendant." ' 6' The second policy involved the principle that the purpose
of the double jeopardy clause was to deny the prosecution "another oppor-
tunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.") 62
53. Id. at 1126-27.
54. Id. at 1126.
55. Id. at 1125. The Florida Supreme Court considered the same cases that the appellate
court had viewed as reversals based on the weight of the evidence and "prefer[red] to view
these ambiguous decisions as reversals which were based on sufficiency." Id. at 1124. For a
discussion of these cases, see supra note 46 and accompanying text. Because the Florida Supreme
Court was not convinced that reversals based on evidentiary weight had been valid in Florida,
it concluded that "[hlenceforth, no appellate court should reverse a conviction or judgment
on the ground that the weight of the evidence is tenuous or insubstantial." 397 So. 2d at 1125.
56. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981).
57. Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2213 (1982). The Court issued a memorandum deci-
sion granting certiorari, see supra note 56; therefore, the Court's reason for granting review
was expressed only in the decision on the merits.
58. 102 S. Ct. at 2213.
59. id. at 2217. The Court stated the general rule that a "criminal defendant who suc-
cessfully appeals a judgment against him 'may be tried anew . . . for the same offence
of which he had been convicted.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896)).
Nevertheless, the Tibbs Court recognized that Burks precludes retrial after a reviewing court
has made a finding of insufficiency of evidence. Id.
60. Id. at 2218.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. I, 11 (1978)). The Court reasoned that
this policy "prevents the State from honing its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through
successive attempts at conviction." Id. The Burks Court had declared that denying the pro-
secution a second chance to muster evidence was central to the goal of the double jeopardy
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The Tibbs Court held that these policies did not apply when a verdict was
reversed for being against the weight of the evidence.63 Accordingly, the Court
held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial in such situations."
The Tibbs majority attempted to justify this holding by analyzing rever-
sals based on the weight of evidence,65 and by distinguishing such reversals
from those based on the insufficiency of evidence. 6 Of particular impor-
tance to the Court was the notion that a reversal based on the evidentiary
weight was not the equivalent of an acquittal.67 Instead, the Court declared
that in such cases the reversing court acts as a "thirteenth juror" by
reweighing the evidence. 8 The Court analogized this occurrence to a dead-
locked jury situation69 in which it is settled that there is no double jeopardy
bar to retrial.7" The Tibbs majority also believed that a reversal based on
the weight of the evidence could not occur unless the prosecution already
had presented evidence legally sufficient for a conviction. 7 ' Under this view,
a reversal based on evidentiary weight is not the same as one based on in-
sufficient evidence. Moreover, the Court stated that a reversal based on the
weight of the evidence did not necessitate a further reversal if the same
evidence resulted in another guilty verdict at a subsequent trial. 2 The ma-
jority added that retrial merely would allow the defendant a "second chance
clause of preventing multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
63. 102 S. Ct. at 2218. For a detailed discussion of the applicability of the Burks policies
in the case of a reversal based on the weight of the evidence, see infra text accompanying
notes 87-111.
64. 102 S. Ct. at 2221.
65. Id. at 2218-19.
66. Id. at 2218.
67. Id. In contrast, the Court considered a reversal based on insufficiency of evidence the
equivalent of an acquittal. See supra text accompanying note 61.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 2218. For an explanation of a court's role as a thirteenth juror when
reversing on the weight of the evidence, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. For an
explanation of a court's role when reversing on the sufficiency of evidence, see supra notes
4-5 and accompanying text.
69. 102 S. Ct. at 2218. The Court offered no authority for this analogy.
70. The Supreme Court has advanced several reasons for permitting retrial after a mistrial
due to a deadlocked jury. First, the Court has noted that a jury's failure to agree on a verdict
is not tantamount to reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt and, thus, is not equivalent
to an acquittal, which would bar retrial. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978).
Second, the Court has expressed fears that if retrial after such an occurrence were always bar-
red, a trial court might coerce a jury into breaking its deadlock, resulting in an unjust judg-
ment. See id. at 509-10. The Court offered a long list of Supreme Court precedents to support
the proposition that retrial is permitted in a deadlocked jury situation. 102 S. Ct. at 2218
n.17 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14, 16 (1976) (per curiam); Johnson
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 401-02 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963)).
71. 102 S. Ct. at 2219. The Court offered no authority for this proposition. For an ex-
planation of what constitutes legally insufficient evidence, see supra note 4.
72. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.18. For a detailed discussion of whether a reversal on the weight
of the evidence would necessitate a reversal on the same evidence at a subsequent trial, see
infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
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at acquittal." 73 Consequently, under such circumstances, the Court did not
consider a new trial to be the type of governmental oppression that the double
jeopardy clause was designed to prevent.74
The Tibbs majority also considered some of the practical ramifications
of its decision. The Court rejected Tibbs's arguments that a distinction be-
tween evidentiary weight and sufficiency would be unworkable, 5 and that
such a distinction would undermine Burks."6 Instead, the majority reasoned
that since both appellate and trial court judges regularly make that
distinction,7 there was no basis for believing that they would be unable to
do so in the aftermath of Tibbs.78 Further, the Court maintained that because
Jackson v. Virginia79 established that due process requires convictions to be
based on sufficient evidence, courts would be prevented from "mask[ing]
reversals based on legally insufficient evidence as reversals grounded on the
weight of the evidence."80
Similarly, the Tibbs Court discussed the practical problems that might have
resulted from a contrary ruling.' The Court reasoned that state legislators
might respond to such a ruling by forbidding appellate courts to reweigh
evidence if it would result in a bar to retrial. "2 Moreover, the Court feared
that a contrary ruling might lead to restrictions on a trial court judge's power
to order a retrial. 3 Either result, the Court noted, might be detrimental to
defendants by preventing judges from providing full protection against un-
just convictions."
Finally, the Court rejected Tibbs's suggestion that the reversal in Tibbs
I was based not on the weight of the evidence, but rather on a finding of
insufficiency.8 The Court considered any ambiguity on this issue to have
73. 102 S. Ct. at 2219.
74. Id. The Court reasoned that "[wihen the State has secured one conviction based on
legally sufficient evidence, it has everything to lose and little to gain by retrial." Id. at 2219 n.19.
75. Id. at 2219-20.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2220. The Court cited several state and federal appellate court decisions as authority.
Id. at 2220 n.20 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir.
1980); United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704, 714-16 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
917 (1972); United States v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36-37 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
864 (1969); Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453-54 (Alaska 1981)).
78. Id. at 2220.
79. 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979). For a discussion of Jackson, see supra note 4.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2220.
81. Id. at 2220 n.22.
82. Id. Although fearing that state legislators might prohibit courts from reweighing evidence
if it would result in a bar to retrial, the Court seemed to ignore the fact that the Florida
Supreme Court, in Tibbs II, prohibited Florida courts from reweighing evidence if retrial would
be allowed upon reversal. See Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1125 (Fla. 1981). Therefore,
if the Court were concerned with state courts having continued power to reweigh evidence,
it should have reached a contrary ruling, at least insofar as Florida was concerned.
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2220 n.22.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2220-21. Tibbs relied heavily on the notion that the reversal in Tibbs I was based
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been resolved in Tibbs II when the Florida Supreme Court characterized
its earlier reversal as based on the weight of the evidence. 6
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE TIBBS HOLDING
The main thrust of the Court's holding in Tibbs was its conclusion that
the two policies underlying the Burks decision were not applicable when a
conviction was reversed for being against the weight of the evidence. 7 Con-
sequently, each policy consideration should be carefully examined. One policy
articulated in Burks involved the special significance attached to acquittals
under the double jeopardy clause. Although the Tibbs Court did not
acknowledge it, this policy applies equally to reversals based on the weight
of evidence as to those based on evidentiary insufficiency. The Burks Court
placed great importance upon whether a reversal was based on a considera-
tion of the defendant's guilt or innocence.88 Similarly, the Florida Supreme
Court displayed a deep concern with Tibbs's guilt or innocence when it
enumerated the weaknesses in the prosecution's evidence." Because a rever-
sal based on the weight of the evidence involves a broad consideration of
the credibility of the entire evidence,9" it logically follows that any such rever-
sal is based largely on a consideration of a defendant's guilt or innocence.
on insufficiency of evidence. Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Tibbs v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 2211
(1982). Perhaps his argument would have been successful if it had been based on the purpose
of the double jeopardy clause and the applicability to his reversal of the policies underlying Burks.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 2221. This controversy was due largely to the ambiguous nature of the
Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Tibbs I. While the opinion was couched in terms of the
weight of the evidence, it stated that "[hiuman liberty should not be forfeited by a conviction
under evidence which is not sufficient to convince a fair and impartial mind of the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt." Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1976) (quoting
McNeil v. State, 104 Fla. 360, 361, 139 So. 791, 792 (1932)). The United States Supreme Court
considered this language to be inconsistent with the result of Tibbs 1. 102 S. Ct. at 2221 n.23.
In Tibbs II, the Florida court attempted to clarify its holding in Tibbs L See supra text accom-
panying notes 51-55. It is interesting to note, however, that Tibbs I was rendered by Justices
Sundberg, Hatchett, Boyd and England, and that these same justices, with the exception of
Justice Hatchett (retired), dissented in Tibbs H. See Brief for Appellant at 6, Tibbs v. Florida,
102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982). These dissenters asserted that Tibbs should not be retried, and that
the reversal in Tibbs I was based on insufficiency. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (Fla.
1981) (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 11.30 (England, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1130-31 (Boyd, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the dissenting opinion in Tibbs, see infra note 111.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2218. The Tibbs Court relied on dicta from Hudson v. Louisiana, 450
U.S. 40 (1981), as authority for the proposition that the rule established in Burks was inap-
plicable to reversals based on the weight of evidence. The Hudson Court, however, expressly
stated that it was not deciding whether the double jeopardy clause would bar retrial after a
conviction was reversed on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
450 U.S. at 44 n.5. For a discussion of the two policies underlying the Burks decision, see
supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
88. See supra text accompanying note 31. The emphasis placed on a defendant's guilt or
innocence also was present in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
89. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the Tibbs Court should have accorded the same degree of
significance to reversals based on evidentiary weight as Burks attached to
acquittals.
In refusing to do so, however, the Tibbs majority rejected the idea that
a conviction based on the same evidence, at a subsequent trial, necessarily
would have to be reversed on the ground that it was against the weight of
the evidence.9 ' The Court did not believe that the evidentiary weight stan-
dard was applied equally to successive convictions. Noting that reversals based
on evidentiary weight are made in the interests of justice, the Tibbs Court
reasoned that while reversal of a first conviction might serve that interest,
reversal after a second conviction might not.9" A contrary view, however,
had been expressed in lower federal court decisions; under this view, when
the government has no additional evidence to present at the second trial,
or when the appellate court concludes that the evidentiary deficiency cannot
be corrected, the trial court should be instructed to dismiss the indictment.93
Moreover, as the Florida Supreme Court declared in a decision relied upon
by the Tibbs majority, a conviction should only be reversed for being against
the weight of the evidence when it is "plainly, manifestly, palpably, clearly
or decidedly against the evidence." 9 ' Under these two approaches, a subse-
quent conviction on the same evidence would require reversal. Thus, it can
be argued that a reversal on the basis of evidentiary weight should be ac-
corded the same degree of significance that Burks attached to acquittals.
91. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.18.
92. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a 1926 Florida Supreme Court deci-
sion, Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 110 So. 547 (1926) (en banc), and on a footnote in a
more recent Second Circuit decision, United States v. Weinstein, 452 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972). The Blocker court stated:
There is in this State no limit to the number of new trials that may be granted
in any case, but it takes a strong case to require an appellate court to grant a
new trial in a case upon the ground of insufficiency of conflicting evidence to sup-
port a verdict when the finding has been made by two juries ...
92 Fla. at 893, 110 So. at 552. The Second Circuit noted that when a defendant was convicted
by a third jury, it would be difficult for any judge to conclude that another trial was required
in the interests of justice. Weinstein, 452 F.2d at 714 n.14.
93. See United States v. Wiley, 517 F.2d 1212, 1220 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (to allow the
prosecution more than one fair chance to present its evidence would unjustly increase its pro-
spects of obtaining a conviction because it would be able to employ the evidence presented
by the defense to establish a prima facie case, and furthermore, the prosecution could correct
any tactical errors it made in the first proceeding); see also United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d
645, 656 (4th Cir. 1974) (when evidence is insufficient and cannot be cured at a subsequent
trial, the indictment should be dismissed rather than a new trial ordered); United States v.
Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1970) (when the prosecution's case was based entirely
on the fruit of illegal arrests and there was no indication that admissible evidence could be
introduced at a new trial, a dismissal of the indictment was required); Phillips v. United States,
311 F.2d 204, 207 (10th Cir. 1962) (recognizing its power under Bryan to order a retrial, the
court "deem(ed] a new trial inappropriate . . . [because] there [was] nothing in the record
to indicate that relevant testimony [was] available or would be adduced upon a new trial").
94. Blocker v. State, 92 Fla. 878, 893, 110 So. 547, 552 (1926) (en banc). For a discussion
of the Tibbs majority's reliance on Blocker, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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The Court's refusal to treat the reversal of Tibbs's conviction as an ac-
quittal appears to be inconsistent with its prior statement in United States
v. Martin Linen Supply Co.91 In that case, the Court stated that "what con-
stitutes an 'acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's
action. '"9 ' The Martin Linen Court further stated that the important ques-
tion was "whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually
represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements
of the offense charged.""' While reversing on the basis of evidentiary weight,
the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs I enumerated several weaknesses in the
state's evidence.98 This should be regarded as a resolution of at least some
of the factual elements of the offense with which Tibbs was charged. The
application of the Martin Linen test to the state supreme court's opinion
in Tibbs I strengthens the contention that Tibbs's reversal should have been
accorded the same degree of significance that Burks attached to acquittals. 99
The other policy underlying Burks, which the Tibbs Court found inap-
plicable to reversals based on evidentiary weight, was the notion that the
double jeopardy clause precludes the prosecution from being granted a sec-
ond opportunity to present evidence which it failed to present at the first
trial.' 0 The Tibbs majority characterized a retrial after a reversal based on
the weight of the evidence as merely a second opportunity for the defendant
to seek acquittal.'"' Furthermore, the majority quoted from United States
v. DiFrancesco'" as authority for the proposition that providing the defen-
dant with a second chance to seek acquittal would not create " 'an unac-
95. 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy barred a government appeal of a district court
order granting a defendant's motion for acquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c), which permits
a judge to enter a judgment of acquittal despite the return of a guilty verdict by the jury).
96. 430 U.S. at 571.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 41.
99. The dissenting Justices in Tibbs argued that the majority's emphasis on judgments of
acquittal was misplaced. 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined
in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. The majority cited United States
v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), and United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978), as authority
for placing such significance on judgments of acquittal. 102 S. Ct. at 2218 n.15. Yet, the Tibbs
Court did not indicate how these cases support such an analysis. Moreover, these cases fail
to propose that an acquittal is required for double jeopardy protection; rather, they establish
that the goal of the double jeopardy clause-protecting defendants from the oppression of
multiple prosecutions-can be served by affording finality to acquittals. See United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129-30 (1980) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188
(1957)); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91-92 (1978). The dissent, therefore, argued that
refusal to treat Tibbs's reversal as an acquittal should not have been fatal to his double jeopardy
objection to retrial because double jeopardy goals should be achieved when a state has failed
to meet its own evidentiary requirements. 102 S. Ct. at 2222 (White, J., dissenting). While
this argument is appealing, it is perhaps more persuasive to argue that the Court should have
treated Tibbs's reversal as an acquittal, making fully applicable the Burks policy of according
special weight to acquittals.
100. 102 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)).
101. Id. at 2219.
102. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
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ceptably high risk that the Government, with its superior resources, [will]
wear down [the] defendant' and obtain conviction solely through its
persistence." 103
Yet, by quoting the "unacceptably high risk" language in DiFrancesco
out of context, the Tibbs Court completely misconstrued that case. In
DiFrancesco, the Court declared that when there has been an acquittal,
"however mistaken the acquittal may have been [the double jeopardy clause
bars retrial because] there would be an unacceptably high risk"'"" of wear-
ing down the defendant. Similarly, the Tibbs Court erroneously quoted from
United States v. Scott' °5 to support the proposition that "[giving the defen-
dant this second opportunity [to seek acquittal] . . . hardly amounts to
'governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy
Clause was intended to protect."" 6 The Scott Court, however, did not in-
tend to establish the rule that when a reversal is based on the weight of
the evidence, a second chance to seek acquittal is proper; rather, the Court's
declaration in Scott only suggested that when a reversal results from a
"statutory right of appeal"' ' or a procedural error, then retrial is not the
sort of government oppression that the double jeopardy clause was designed
to prevent.'0 8 In fact, when a reversal is based on evidentiary considera-
tions, although the defendant is given a second chance to seek an acquittal,
the Scott Court maintained that the defendant would be subject to the
relentless pursuit of an all-powerful state.'"" Thus, the Tibbs majority's
reliance on both the "high risk" language of DiFrancesco, and the "govern-
mental oppression" language of Scott, was misplaced. Consequently, the ma-
jority's conclusion that it simply was "afford[ing] the defendant a second
opportunity to seek a favorable judgment""' was unsubstantiated."'
103. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980)).
104. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980) (emphasis added). It also is
interesting to note that DiFrancesco involved the right of the government to appeal a defen-
dant's sentence and, thus, was unrelated to a Tibbs-type evidentiary problem.
105. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
106. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)).
107. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978).
108. Id. The Scott Court reasoned that when the government is willing to put on its case,
but the defendant opts to terminate the proceeding for reasons unrelated to his guilt or in-
nocence, the goal of protecting the defendant from oppressive state prosecutions is irrelevant.
Id. at 96.
109. Id.
110. 102 S. Ct. at 2219.
111. The Tibbs dissent argued that a reversal of a subsequent conviction on the same evidence
would be required. Therefore, it was the prosecution, not the defendant, that was obtaining
the second chance. Id. at 2221 (White, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent maintained that
the prosecution at Tibbs's trial had received a full and fair opportunity, free of procedural
error, to present its best case. Id. at 2221-22. Thus, the dissent in Tibbs argued, the only
purpose for allowing a retrial of Tibbs would be to provide the prosecution with an oppor-
tunity to present new evidence. Id. at 2222. If the prosecution had no new evidence, reprosecu-
tion would serve only to harass the defendant. Id. Therefore, the dissent concluded that because
one policy of the double jeopardy clause was to deny the prosecution a second opportunity
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An analysis of Tibbs v. Florida also requires a discussion of the purpose
of the double jeopardy clause. The origins of the double jeopardy concept
may be traced to ancient Greek and Roman law." 2 As one scholar has noted,
a "moral sentiment" evolved that "no man should suffer twice for a single
act."" 3 Yet, when the double jeopardy clause was adopted by the first Con-
gress it was enacted "without much debate or indication of its intended
meaning.""4
Nevertheless, relying on the language of Roger Sherman, a member of
the first Congress,' the Tibbs Court determined that retrying a defendant
whose conviction had been reversed was consistent with the intent of the
framers of the fifth amendment. Sherman stated that if' a defendant was
"convicted on the first [trial], and anything should appear to set the judg-
ment aside, he [could receive] a second [trial]."" ' 6 Sherman's major con-
cern, however, was that the right of a defendant to appeal a conviction should
not be precluded by the double jeopardy clause;" 7 hence, Sherman was not
interested primarily in whether the government would have the ability to
retry a defendant whose conviction had been reversed. Thus, the Tibbs Court
fundamentally misconstrued Sherman's concern over the right of appeal when,
based on that concern, the majority concluded that the framers of the fifth
amendment envisioned no double jeopardy bar to retrial after a conviction
had been reversed.
to introduce evidence which it failed to produce in the first proceeding, retrial should be barred
after a reversal based on the weight of the evidence. Id. at 2222-23.
112. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (tracing the
development of the double jeopardy concept from ancient Greece to the present); United States
v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973) (quoting the Greek orator Demosthenes who,
in 355 B.C., stated that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice on the same issue"),
aff'd, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); see also J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 1-37 (1969) (discussing the
history of double jeopardy concepts from the ancient Greeks to their adoption by the first
Congress). See generally M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-15 (1969) (tracing the history of
the double jeopardy concept in English law).
113. J. SIGLER, supra note 112, at 35. Sigler found this sentiment present among the Roman
jurists and canon lawyers. Id.
114. Id. at 31.
115. 102 S. Ct. at 2217 n.14.
116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 753 (J. Gales ed. 1789). Several other members of the first Con-
gress commented on the meaning of the proposed double jeopardy clause. For example, Samuel
Livermore believed that the clause was "essential" because "persons may be brought to trial
for crimes they are guilty of, but for want of evidence may be acquitted; in such cases, it
is the universal practice in Great Britain, and in this country, that persons shall not be brought
to a second trial for the same offense .. " Id. Allowing retrial after a finding of lack of
evidence seems inconsistent with this language. Another member of the first Congress, Egbert
Benson of New York, expressed the idea that the double jeopardy clause should not stand
in the way of a defendant's right to appeal and, therefore, a defendant may be entitled to
more than one trial. Id.; see also J. SIGLER, supra note 112, at 30 (discussion of the debates
on the double jeopardy clause in the first Congress).
117. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1975) (discussing the intent of the framers
of the fifth amendment); see also J. SILER, supra note 112, at.30_ (discussing Sherman's ap-
proval of a legislative effort to protect a defendant's right of appeal).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 32:663
In light of the sparse indications of the framers' intent, an examination
of judicial constructions is essential to determine the purpose of the double
jeopardy clause. Perhaps the clearest expression of the goal of this clause
was articulated by the Supreme Court in Green v. United States.' 8 In an
often quoted passage,' 9 the Green Court declared:
The constitutional prohibition against "double jeopardy" was designed to
protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possi-
ble conviction more than once for an alleged offense. . . . The underlying
idea . . . is that the State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty. 20
This admirable purpose of protecting individuals from the hazards of multi-
ple prosecutions has served as the basis of many Supreme Court decisions
in addition to Green.'2 ' Nevertheless, by holding that the double jeopardy
clause imposed no barriers to retrying a defendant who successfully appealed
a conviction, the Tibbs majority seemed to ignore the underlying purpose
of the provision.' 22 The Court, however, found support in two sources for
creating this exception to the purpose of the double jeopardy clause.
First, relying on United States v. Tateo,'2 3 the Tibbs Court stated that
society could not afford to grant immunity to all defendants who succeed
118. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
119. Recent Supreme Court decisions quoting this passage from Green include the following:
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1980); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410,
427 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978); Crist v.
Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n.13 (1978); Abney
v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977).
120. 355 U.S. at 187-88.
121. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), is perhaps the best example of a Supreme
Court decision based on the double jeopardy clause purpose enunciated in Green. For a full
discussion of Burks, see supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text. Another case illustrating
this goal of the double jeopardy clause is United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.
564 (1977) (double jeopardy clause bars appeal of acquittal under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c), which
permits a judge to enter a judgment of acquittal despite the return of a guilty verdict by the
jury). The Martin Linen Court stated that "[alt the heart of [the double jeopardy clause] is
the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizen to a second trial for
the same offense would arm Government with a potent instrument of oppression." Id. at 569.
Finally, a third case expressing similar concerns is United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975)
(double jeopardy clause is not a bar to government appeal from a district court post-verdict
dismissal of an indictment). The Wilson Court found the common law origins of the double
jeopardy clause to be "directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions. Id. at 342.
122. 102 S. Ct. at 2217.
123. 377 U.S. 463 (1964). Tateo established what may be termed the "fairness rationale"
for allowing retrial after a reversal for procedural error. The Tateo Court stated that "[clor-
responding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing
one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial." Id. at 466; see Note, Prevention
of Multiple Prosecutions, supra note 18, at 560 (discussion of the Tateo "fairness rationale"
as a justification for allowing retrial after a conviction has been reversed).
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in obtaining reversals of their convictions.' 2  Tibbs misapplied Tateo, however,
because that case dealt with a reversal based on procedural error;' 25 by con-
trast, the reversal in Tibbs was based upon the weight of evidence. One
scholar has suggested that society's interest in retrial does not apply with
equal force to reversals for lack of evidence,' 26 because after a defendant's
conviction has been reversed for evidentiary reasons "[s]ociety should have
no more fear of releasing such a defendant than of releasing a defendant
who has been acquitted by a jury. .. ."I"' Accordingly, because the Tibbs
reversal was based upon a broad consideration of the credibility of the
evidence, the societal interest in retrial was minimized. Consequently, the
Tibbs Court's first justification for creating an exception to the double
jeopardy clause, which was adopted to prevent multiple prosecutions, was
based on societal interests that had little force under the circumstances
presented by the Tibbs case.
The Tibbs majority relied on United States v. Scott'28 to establish a sec-
ond justification for creating its exception and, thereby, allowing defendants
who successfully appeal their convictions to be retried. Tibbs interpreted Scott
as standing for the proposition that "retrial after reversal of a conviction
is not the type of governmental oppression targeted by the Double -Jeopardy
Clause."' 29 This interpretation, however, fails to recognize the distinction
drawn in Scott between reversals based on questions of guilt or innocence,
and those based on constitutional, statutory, or other procedural grounds.' 30
Scott would be more accurately interpreted as supporting the contention that
no governmental oppression exists when a defendant whose conviction was
reversed on the grounds of procedural error is retried.' The Tibbs Court,
124. 102 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964)). This notion
is based on the fear that criminals will be released only to prey upon society. See Comment,
Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 31 U. CHI.
L. REv. 365, 370-71 (1964) (discussion of the societal interests involved in retrial) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, A New Trial After Appellate Reversal].
125. 377 U.S. at 464 (trial testimony and trial judge's comments tainted the voluntariness
of a guilty plea).
126. See Thompson, supra note 15, at 517-18.
127. Comment, A New Trial After Appellate Reversal, supra note 124, at 371. The author
reasoned that after an appellate reversal for lack of evidence, there is no presumption that
the prosecution's burden of proof has been met. Instead, "the appellate court is specifically
holding that the burden has not been met." Id. Thus, a defendant whose conviction is reversed
on that basis is in a position quite similar to that of a defendant who has been acquitted.
128. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
129. 102 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 1978)).
130. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 n.ll (1978). For a discussion of the Scott Court's
concern with whether a reversal was based upon a defendant's guilt or innocence, see supra
note 30.
131. The "governmental oppression" notions employed by the Tibbs Court were not used
by the Scott Court in reference to reversals based on the soundness of the evidence. Instead,
the Scott Court found that retrial of a criminal defendant, who successfully had obtained a
reversal of his conviction on procedural grounds, was "not an act of governmental oppression
of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect." 437 U.S.
19831
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therefore, wholly misconstrued Scott as justifying its exception to the pur-
pose of the double jeopardy clause.
To summarize, the purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to protect
individuals from multiple prosecutions for the same offense. Consequently,
the retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been reversed can be justified
only when that reversal was based on procedural error, and, therefore, not
based on considerations of guilt or innocence. Retrial after a reversal based
on the weight of the evidence, which inescapably involves a consideration
of guilt or innocence, clearly violates the purpose of the double jeopardy
clause. Moreover, the policies underlying the Burks decision, which accord
special significance to acquittals and deny the prosecution a second chance
to present evidence which it failed to present at the first trial, clearly are
applicable to a reversal based on evidentiary weight.
THE IMPACT OF TIBBS V. FLORIDA
The Tibbs decision erodes the fifth amendment right not to be "twice
put in jeopardy."' 32 It requires a defendant, whose conviction already has
been reversed by an appellate court on issues dealing with guilt or
innocence,' 33 to face for a second time the "heavy pressures and burdens-
psychological, physical, and financial,""'3 that accompany criminal charges.
By allowing a defendant to be retried after his conviction was reversed because
it was against the weight of the evidence,' 33 the Tibbs decision also will have
a powerful impact on appellate review of convictions.
The most obvious problem raised by this decision is the possibility that
an appellate judge who seriously doubts the sufficiency of the evidence might
employ Tibbs to avoid ruling on the sufficiency question.' 36 In other words,
to avoid reversing a conviction on the basis of evidentiary insufficiency, a
judge might rule that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence
and, subsequently, remand the case for a new trial.'37 The Tibbs majority
rejected this possibility, relying on the due process requirement imposed on
at 91. Nevertheless, the Tibbs Court relied on Scott as support for the general idea that retrial
of a defendant whose conviction was reversed based on the weight of the evidence did not
amount to governmental oppression. 102 S. Ct. at 2217.
132. U.S. CON T. amend. V.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
134. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (prosecution of a youth in adult court, on
the same offense that was the subject of an adjudicatory proceeding in juvenile court, held
to violate the double jeopardy clause).
135. 102 S. Ct. at 2221.
136. Id. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting).
137. Id. The Florida Supreme Court, in Tibbs II, also recognized that appellate tribunals
might have been tempted "to direct a retrial merely by styling reversals as based on 'weight'
when in fact there is a lack of competent substantial evidence to support the verdict of judg-
ment and the double jeopardy clause should operate to bar retrial." Tibbs v. State, 397 So.
2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fla. 1981). Therefore, the state supreme court prohibited other Florida courts
from using an evidentiary weight standard to reverse convictions. Id. at 1125.
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courts by Jackson v. Virginia'38 to reach a finding of insufficient evidence
when it exists.' 39 The Tibbs dissent, on the other hand, viewed the majority
holding as creating an avenue to undermine the decisions in both Burks and
Jackson."' The possibility of undermining the principles established by those
decisions compelled the Florida Supreme Court, in Tibbs II, to abolish ap-
pellate court reversals of convictions when such reversals were based on
evidentiary weight.'"' There are, however, other jurisdictions which still allow
a conviction to be reversed in the interest of justice if it is determined to
be against the weight of the evidence." 2 Therefore, the Tibbs decision may
have the effect of subjecting defendants to retrials in situations where the
principles established in Burks and Jackson otherwise would combine to bar
retrial.
Tibbs also undermines clarification of the double jeopardy clause and its
policies recognized in Burks. The Burks decision can be viewed as part of
the "closer look""' 3 at the double jeopardy clause that was taken by the
Supreme Court in the mid-1970s. Burks clarified the Bryan-Forman cases"'
by establishing that retrial was permitted after a reversal due to procedural
error, but not after a reversal due to a failure of proof. ' The Tibbs Court
sanctioned a "third category"" 6 of reversal, one based on evidentiary weight,
which may lead either to inconsistent appellate results, or to burdening higher
courts with the task of determining whether appellate reversals were based
138. 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 (1979).
139. 102 S. Ct. at 2220.
140. Id. at 2223 (White, J., dissenting). If a judge reversed a conviction on the weight of
the evidence, instead of making a finding of evidentiary insufficiency, the Burks double jeopardy
bar to retrial would be undermined. In addition, the dissent stated that a judge's desire to
allow retrial might influence his decision whether to reverse on the weight or sufficiency of
the evidence, thereby undermining Jackson. Id.
141. See supra note 137.
142. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 33; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 33; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 770.1 (West 1982); R.I. SUPER. Or. R. CRIM. P. 33.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1977) (after
a "closer look" it is evident that the double jeopardy clause was "directed at the threat of
multiple prosecutions"); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975) (Court found it
necessary to examine more clearly the policies of the double jeopardy clause to determine the
appropriateness of governmental appeals); see also Note, Prevention of Multiple Prosecutions,
supra note 18, at 549 ("In taking a 'closer look,' the Court has viewed the main objective
of the double jeopardy clause to be the prevention of multiple prosecutions"). The Burks deci-
sion fits into this "closer look" category of cases because it was premised on the notion that
the double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent multiple prosecutions. See supra text ac-
companying notes 27-28.
144. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
145. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1978). For a discussion of the distinction
drawn in Burks between reversals based on procedural error and those based on evidentiary
considerations, see supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
146. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1122-23 (Fla. 1981) (the Florida court referred to this
category as "appellate reversals where the evidence is technically sufficient but its weight is
so tenuous or insubstantial that a new trial is ordered in the interests of justice").
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on the weight or sufficiency of evidence."'7 Because these concepts are closely
related, confusion between them seems certain.
Finally, the Tibbs decision might lead to inefficiency in the criminal justice
system.' 8 The Court's holding allows the prosecution a second chance to
muster evidence after a reversal based on evidentiary weight.' 49 Allowing this
second chance could "serve to condone and perhaps perpetuate careless pro-
secutorial trial preparation and practice.""'
CONCLUSION
An analysis of Tibbs v. Florida leads to the conclusion that allowing a
defendant to be retried, after his conviction has been reversed on the basis
of evidentiary weight, is both contrary to the purpose of the double jeopardy
clause, and inconsistent with that provision's policies as articulated in recent
Supreme Court decisions. The purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to
prevent multiple prosecutions for the same offense. While decisions rendered
prior to Burks failed to construe the double jeopardy clause as preventing
retrial of a defendant whose conviction had been reversed, the Burks Court
recognized that these cases defeated the purpose of the double jeopardy
clause. Thus, Burks barred the retrial of a defendant whose conviction had
been reversed, unless the reversal was based on procedural error. The justifica-
tions for this exception do not apply with equal force to a reversal based
on the weight of the evidence. The Tibbs Court's inclusion of such a rever-
sal within this exception undermines the goal of the double jeopardy clause.
Further, the holding in Tibbs is inconsistent with the principles announced
in Burks because a reversal based on evidentiary weight should be treated
as an acquittal, thus barring retrial, and because retrial after such a reversal
gives the prosecution a second opportunity to amass evidence. Tibbs establish-
ed a distinction between reversals based on the weight of evidence and those
based on the insufficiency of evidence. In drawing this distinction, however,
the Court did not recognize the true purpose of the double jeopardy clause.
147. Id. at 1125. The Florida Supreme Court viewed the possibility of "disparate appellate
results," and the possibility of having to review appellate reversals based on "evidentiary short-
comings," as two additional reasons for abolishing this category of reversals. Id.
148. Cf. United States v. Wiley, 517 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Although Wiley is a pre-
Burks decision concerning retrial after a finding of insufficiency of evidence, the notion that
"confining the Government to a single prosecution furthers sound judicial administration by
creating incentives for thorough preparation and careful presentation of the Government's case,"
id. at 1220 n.39, is equally applicable to retrial after a reversal based on the weight of the evidence.
149. 102 S. Ct. at 2219 n.19. The Tibbs Court admitted that a "second chance for the defen-
dant, of course, inevitably affords the prosecutor a second try. . . . It is possible that new
evidence or advance understanding of the defendant's trial strategy will make the State's case
even stronger during a second trial than it was at the first." Id.
150. Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1977) (petitioner's right not to
be placed in double jeopardy was violated when her conviction was affirmed in part and remanded
for the sole purpose of allowing the prosecution to prove an essential element of the charged
offense). While Sumpter was an insufficiency case, the idea of careless trial preparation is equally
applicable to a Tibbs-type evidentiary weight problem.
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Considering the policies underlying the Burks decision, and the Scott Court's
emphasis on whether reversals are based on questions of guilt or innocence,
a distinction between weight and sufficiency of evidence appears to be im-
proper in the double jeopardy context.
The Tibbs Court had the opportunity to extend the protection of the double
jeopardy clause to a defendant whose conviction was reversed on the basis
of evidentiary weight. The Court's refusal to do so raises the possibility that
reviewing courts will employ Tibbs to avoid ruling on the sufficiency of
evidence, which would result in a greater number of retrials concerning
evidentiary questions. The double jeopardy clause should bar retrial of a
defendant whose conviction has been reversed on the grounds that it was
against the weight of the evidence; to subject such a defendant to the rigors
of a second trial is surely the type of government oppression that the clause
was designed to prevent.
Robert L. Baker

